I was shocked when I came across this book review about Wilber’s, “Up from Eden.” I didn’t realize that Ken had written certain things about the evolution of man, which is really, really wrong. He seems to have taken basic 19th century physical anthropology and used it to make an argument for this grand theory. When I say wrong, I mean it is obvious that he didn’t actually read or use any information from the second half of the 20th century and seemed to rely on authors that weren’t archaeologists/anthropologists themselves, but from philosophical theorists that were influenced by ideas of “Ontogeny recapitulates Phylogeny.” This was a theory used for 70 years, and who’s only use was a way to prove the inferiority of the lower, non-western European, races. I’ll go into the history if anyone want’s me too, but a quick review of Gould’s, “A Mismeasure of Man,” would be the best place. As soon as the theory was completely disproven, Neotony, which is the opposite of ORP was used for a brief time, until all theories trying to find physical prove of the inferiority of the lower races was abandoned.
The review is dated, so I should add something else. Australopithecus afarensis and robustus, are no longer assumed to be our ancestors. At the moment there’s a lot up in the air and researchers are trying to make sense of a lot of new finds.
The things Ken seems to claim in this book are ridiculous to even a 3rd year undergrad. studying these things.
Here’s the review:
THE EVOLUTION OP CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ESSAY REVIEW OP UP
FROM EDEN (WILBER 1981)
Michael Winkelman
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85387
Determination of the stages of the evolution of human
consciousness lies at the interface of many scientific disciplines,
including anthropology, archaeology, paleontology, biology,
psychology, cross-cultural psychology, philosophy and
epistemology. One widely cited recent theory of the evolution
ofhuman consciousness is Up From Eden by the transpersonal
psychologist Ken Wilber, widely acclaimed as the leading
theoretician in his field (Grof 1981). His works The Spectrum
of Consciousness and The Atman Project provide widely
recognized seminal integrations of Western and Eastern
psychologies. His models of the evolution of human
consciousness are further expounded in Transformations of
Consciousness: Conventional and Contemplative Perspectives
on Development (Wilber, Engler, and Brown 1986) (see
Winkelman 1987 for review).
Because of Wilber's success in uniting diverse
psychological theories and perspectives within the field of
transpersonal psychology (e.g., Wilber 1977,1980), his esteem
within the field of transpersonal psychology appears unequaled
and his works are widely considered as basic texts. These
earlier outstanding achievements have created a context
within which Up From Eden has been uncritically accepted.
Without an extensive background in paleontology, archaeology,
anthropology, and cross-cultural psychology, as well as other
fields necessary for a critical evaluation of this work, one is
likely to be mislead into accepting Wilber's perspectives. This
is reinforced by the fact that widespread ethnocentrisms
found among Westerners and within Western psychology
itself are found in Wilber's perspectives on the evolution of
human consciousness. Wilber's theories expound perspectives
central to Euroamerican culture and Western psychology, and
contain biases and assumptions which are at variance with
contemporary anthropological findings and perspectives on
the prehistorical, historical and contemporary cross-cultural
conditions ofhuman consciousness and cognitive capacities.
In Up From Eden, Wilber (1981) interprets mythological,
anthropological, archaeological, and psychological data to
construct a theory of the prehistorical and historical evolution
of human consciousness. The theoretical framework is the
model of ontogenetic evolution of human consciousness
presented in The Atman Project (1980). Up From Eden argues
that the consciousness of the human race as a whole began in
an undifferentiated state similar to contemporary human
infants and evolved through various specific stages of
differentiation and intellectual development similar to
contemporary psychological and cognitive development. It is
suggested that the highest level achieved by broad segments
of the human race so far is the stage typical of modern day
Westerners at the solar ego/formal operations stage.
Strikingly different reviews of Up From Eden are provided
in a 1982 issue of Phoenixby John White and Phillip Staniford.
While both reviewers recognize that Wilber has made outstanding
contributions to transpersonal psychology, their
assessments of Up From Eden differ. White's review extols the
virtues of the general view of the evolution of consciousness
proposed by Wil ber, and repeats the acclaims ofother reviewers
which suggest that Up From Eden outranks other annals of
the intellectual history ofWestern Civilization such as Darwin's
Origin of Species and Freud's Interpretation of Dreams.
However, Staniford points out that Wilber's view ofhuman
evolution is simplistically unilineal and based on 19th century
anthropology while ignoringcurrentanthropological research
and points of view.
Wilber's efforts to integrate Western and Eastern psychology
have made major contributions to psychology, but Up
From Eden has many problems with facticity and interpretation.
This review was written to reconcile Wilber's theoretical
perspectives on the evolution of human consciousness with
current anthropological research and perspectives on early
hominids and contemporary variation cross-culturally in
cognitive processes. Initially there was no intention to call
into question the adequacy of the ontogenetic model in explicating
phylogenetic evolution. However, in the process of
reviewing materials relevant to the nature of consciousness of
hominids and early humans, I was forced to recognize that the
ontogenetic model was incapable of accounting for the phylogenetic
evolutionary data. During the last century biologists
recognized that ontogenetic models were inadequate in
accounting for phylogenetic development (Gould 1977).
This review sets forth data which illustrate that
phylogenetic evolution of human consciousness does not
correspond to the ontogenetic patterns as Wilber argues. The
following materials sketch Wilber's ontogenetically based
phylogenetic theory of the different stages of evolution of
human consciousness as presented in Up From Eden.
Anthropological, ethological and cross-cultural cognitive
research is reviewed to indicate the actual cognitive capacities
and conditions of consciousness of pre-sapien hominids, early
Homo sapiens, and contemporary non-Western peoples.
Wilber's theoretical perspectives are revised in light of the
evidence presented.
UROBORIC STAGE
The first stage of Wilber's theory of the evolution of
human consciousness is called "Uroboric*. Uroboric refers to
the mythical serpent eating it's own tail and forming or
representing an undifferentiated mass, and is used as a
characterization of consciousness at this period. Wilber groups
at the Uroboric stage Australopithecus africanus,Homohabilis
and Homo erectus, who lived from 3 million to 200,000 years
ago. Wilber suggests that these hominids lived without
consciousness, in a primitive narcissistic state of embeddedness
with nature which was characterized by confusion of self
and other, and of inner experiences and the external world.
They are said to have been bound up in a participation
mystique of unconscious identity: an undifferentiated dreamy
autistic state in which they did not know themselves as
separate entities, and did not have a self conscious life. He
claims that these hominids lacked the capacity for true
mental reflection and verbal representation and were ruled
by instincts and biological drives.
Wilber points out that his considerations devote little
attention to the archaeological record, but instead rely upon
discussions of others such as Arieti, Becker, Berdyaev, Cassier,
Gebser, Neumann and Whyte. However, these individuals are
not paleontologists, archaeologists, nor anthropologists, but
other cross-disciplinary synthesizers who are presenting their
own evolutionary or psychodynamic theories, derived from
THE EVOLUTION OP CONSCIOUSNESS 25
Western cultural assumptions. There is no review of
anthropological research on the hominids of this era, and
many assertions are in direct conflict with widely accepted
anthropological research on such issues such as the appearance
of language and cultural development.
The primary argument substantiating Wilber's
characterization of these early hominids is that serpent
symbolism, associated with the early developmental stages
within the Kundalini tradition, is also associated with
historically ancient peopl es. Wilber makes reference to serpent
motifs in Egypt, in bronze age Africa, the Coptic peoples, and
in the Eden myth. These cultures have no relationship to the
hominids that Wilber places in this stage, since these cultures
occurred hundreds of thousands to millions of years after the
hominids he is considering.
Furthermore, there is no systematic consideration of the
distribution of the serpent motif and its relationship to socioeconomic
conditions, as would be necessary to link such
symbolism to stages of sociocultural evolution or to the
evolution of human consciousness. Although such symbolism
may provide important clues about the cultural representations
of consciousness, they must be studied in a systematic crosscultural
fashion and in relationship to social conditions in a
representative sample of human cultures. Without such
systematic investigations, no causal relationships can be
inferred, nor can we control for the worldwide diffusion of
serpent worship and symbolism in ancient times (e.g., see Fox
1976).
Instead of presenting evidence about these early hominids,
Wilber calls upon what he refers to as circumstantial evidence:
the belief that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. He then
illustrates by reference to Pi aget and other psychologists that
human infants have the characteristics that he attributes to
these pre-sapien hominids. However, ontogenetic data do not
provide evidence about phylogenetic evolution. If we wish to
illustrate correspondences of phylogenetic evolution with
ontogenetic patterns, we must have evidence about early
phylogenetic stages, not theories. Wilber has presented us
with no evidence about the hominids in this era and nothing
to support the contentions except the discredited notion that
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Wilber states that there is
no way to prove or disprove his assertions, but in fact
archaeological and ethnological research clearly refutes his
scenario.
AUSTRALOPITHECUS AND THE GREAT APES
Tobias (1971a) reviews evidence arguing that even
Australopithecus exploited a mental, manipulative, and
cultural capacity upon which they depended for survival, and
"...had a well-developed cultural life based primarily upon the
use and modification ofbone for survival" (1971a: 132). Needless
to say, this characterization would have also applied to later
hominids such as Homo habilis, who showed a systematically
progressive use of stone tools. Montague (1976) argues that
tool use and transmission of such knowledge implies the
presence of language among Australopithecus and Homo
habilis. Anthropologists generally agree that it is likely that
language beyond rudimentary signalling forms was present
as long as 2-3 million years ago (e.g., see Jolly and Flog 1979
and Holloway 1976). They argue that the complexity of their
hunting activities would have required the use of language to
coordinate activities. The paleobiological evidence is also
consistent with the assumption that language was present
(see section on The Fossil Record and Neural Organization"
in Hamad, Steklins, and Lancaster 1976). Isaac (1976) points
out that there was the imposition of arbitrary design rules in
the construction of some tools during the Middle Pleistocene
0-5 million years ago). This not only indicates symbolic
activity in the transmission of knowledge, but suggests the
differentiation between different groups on the basis of these
arbitrary stylistic differences.
Planning for future hunting activities and the creation
and maintenance of a tool use tradition based in the cultural
transmission of abstract ideas would have required object
permanence, a notion of the future, long term memory, rational
planning, and differentiation of self from the environment
and others. The use of arbitrary stylistic differences in tools
suggest the development of a self concept as a locus for
organization of experience.
In his comparative assessmentofAuafrafopif/tecua.Tobias
suggests (1971a:l27) that anything chimpanzees and gorillas
can do, Australopithecus and subsequent hominids could
have donebetter since they hadlarger sized brains. Chevalier-
Skolnikoff s (1976) studies show that the great apes complete
all of Sensory-Motor Intelligence series in all modalities
(tactile/kinesthetic, visual/body, visual/gestural, and visual/
facial) except the verbal mode. "They are able to initiate and
effect change in their environment, and can experimentally,
or mentally invent new means to accomplish such changes
(Chevelier-Skolnikoff 1976:179). Tanner and Zihlman
(1976:470) review ethological studies of chimpanzees and
suggest: "...an animal's selection among'conciliatory* gestures,
such as presenting, bowing, bobbing, crouching, kissing and
grinning as appropriate reaction to another's antagonistic
behavior exemplifies an awareness and weighing of the
intensity of another animals in tent....Their social interaction
and communication appear to reflect an incipient concept of
'other**. Their review of experimental studies suggests that a
complementary concept of "self" also exists, as chimps display
self recognition in mirrors, which monkeys do not exhibit.
They suggest that research indicates that chimpanzees utilize
cognitive mapping, least distance strategies, organization
and selective use of environmental information, concealment
of information, emotional cues and intentions, and crossmodality
perception. Cross modality perception involves the
ability to recognize a given object regardless of the sense
modality employed to receive the information. This ability,
considered uniquely human until the 1970's, is considered
essential for symbolism and a necessary (but not sufficient)
elementofhuman language (see Desmond 1979; Linden 1974;
Rumbaugh 1977; Premack 1976; Sebeock and Umiker-Sebeock
1980.)
This research indicates that chimpanzees reach a mental
development somewhere between the ages of 2 and 5 with
respect to humans, with limitations primarily with respect to
verbal, not symbolic abilities. Therefore, mature adult
chimpanzees evolve beyond most of the characterizations of
the uroboric stage and the subsequent typhonic stage. Early
Australopithecus was at least as advanced as chimpanzees;
the differences in brain size and the presence of tools make
this incontrovertible. The development of chimpanzees make
it clear that no normal adult pre-sapien hominids in the past
3 million years were operating at the uroboric level as outlined
in Up From Eden or as expanded in The Atman Project.
26 ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS [1(3-4)1
TYPHONIC STAGE
Wilber's typhonic stage spans the period from 200,000-
10,000 B.P., roughly corresponding to the era from the
emergence ofHomo sapiens until the beginnings of civilization
or history. The typhon is a mythological creature, half human
and half animal, representing Wilber's characterization of
humans at this stage. Wilber suggests that these early Homo
sapiens lacked a body-self differentiation, language, a logical
and conceptual mind, and the ability to differentiate the mind
from the body (p.41-2). He suggests that they utilized protolinguistic
structures, were characterized by subject/object
and part/whole confusions, and were incapable of extensive
temporal consciousness. The previous discussion on Australopithecus
and the great apes directly refutes much of this
characterization.
Wilber discusses cave art and totemism to substantiate
his characterizations. However, analysis of that material
from an anthropological perspective illustrates the very
abilities Wilber wants to deny. Wilber suggests that the cave
art of the Sorcerer of Trois Freres (a combination of animals
parts representing a shaman), was a "self portrait," by a
sorcerer who "experienced himself and his world" (p.44) in
that way, as a collection of animals. Although typhonic stage
humans are characterized by difficulty in distinguishing
symbol from reality and as incapable of differentiating self
from body or psyche from environment, they are able to
represent themselves symbolicallyby combining animal parts.
The cognitive abilities attributed to the artist are not sufficient
to account for the activities attributed. Mar shack (1972)
further demonstrates that the Trois Freres drawings are
lunar calendrical representations, placing the representations
still further beyond the abilities attributed to these people by
Wilber, since they would require not only the capacity for
complex representation, but also an extended sense of time,
which Wilber does not attribute to humans until the next
stage.
Wilber s uggests that totemi sm is a belief"... which regards
a certain animal as an ancestor, a friend or some kind of
powerful and providential being" (p.48), and derives from a
lack of differentiation or an only partial differentiation of the
individual from the natural environment, in particular from
animals. Levi-Strauss (1962) provides a widely accepted review
and synthesis of the perspectives offered on totemism in the
anthropological tradition. The essence of Levi-Strauss's
argument (1962:1966) is that totemistic practices are a
technique for differentiating human societies by means of
analogy. Totemism involves a process of postulation of a
homology between differential features existing between
species and between human groups; as animal species differ
among themselves, so dohuman groups differ. The differences
between human groups become represented by the more
obvious and collectively shared perceptions of differences
between animal species. Levi-Strauss's demonstrates how
totemic practices function as an analogic mode of thought,
involving the same processes and level of mental functioning
which underlies scientific thought. If early Homo sapiens had
totemistic beliefs, Wilber has underestimated their cognitive
abilities, since they would have required not only abstract
thought but difTerentiationof self from environment, animals
and others. Wilber's description of totemism appears to
correspond more closely to the guardian spirit complex.
However, even in such a case, ascription of confusion of
identity is inappropriate. Any such characterization would
alsobeapplicabletopresentday trance mediums, whocertainly
don't evidence general confusion of identity in normal states.
Jolly and nog's (1979) discussion of tool manufacturing
among archaic Homo sapiens (100,000 B.P.) illustrate a
cognitive capacity based in symbolic behavior. Archaic Homo
sapiens tool builders used a "prepared core technique" involving
three entirely separate processes, requiring that: "the whole
sequence...be held in the imagination and executed in the
right order—nothing resembling the finished tool emerges
until the final blow...[Like a person working all week for a
Friday paycheck, [the tool maker gets] no results until the
very end" (Jolly and Plog 1979:246-7). In the subsequent
discussion of the Mousterian tradition (100,000-40,000 B.P.),
they suggest that: "each tool type was made to a standard
pattern in a way that is eloquent testimony...to the ability of
the Mousterian stone worker to hold a pattern in the 'mind's
eye" (p. 253).
Not only is symbolic activity and planning for the future
clearly established in these early Homo sapiens, but religious
activities are present as well. "Among the remains of archaic
Homo sapiens...we repeatedly find relics that seem to have a
symbolic rather than utilitarian value...religion was clearly
established" (Jolly and Plog 1979;258). There is also strong
evidence of a widespread bear cult as well as ritual human
burials and associated evidence which "seems
indisputabfly]...related to belief in the supernatural" (Jolly
and Plog 1979;259). Isaac (1976) points out that burials, grave
offerings and cults extend through the Late Acheulan,
Mousterian and Middle Stone Age (200,000-45,000 B.P.).
Thus, it appears that throughout the typhonic era as specified
by Wilber, artifacts suggest that humans had a conception of
the afterlife, human physical mortality, and human spiritual
survival.
R. White (1982) reviews the archaeological evidence
suggesting that regular social aggregations occurred during
the Upper Paleolithic (beginning 40,000 B.P.). He points out
the probable use of morphological differences in artifacts to
symbolize territory or social boundaries (see also Wobst 1974),
and the imposition of formal standards in the working of
antler and bone to communicate individual and/or corporate
(social) identity by means of purposeful stylistic variation (c.f.
Conkey 1978). White also points out evidence suggesting the
use of personal ornaments capable of communicating
individual or corporate identity, as well as the presence of
widespread material exchange based upon structured
exchange or the approval of groups living in distant locales. In
his review of cave art and other non-functional artifacts,
Marshack (1972) suggests that we find the beginnings of
science. As far back as 30,000 B.C., we find an evolved,
complex and sophisticated tradition of astronomical observation
and recording which Marshack characterizes as "a
cognitive, time-factored and time-factoring technique....
Apparently we have archaeological evidence for the use of the
same basic cognitive processes that appear later in science and
writing" (1972:57-58, emphasis in original).
Given that the same physical brain capacity and the same
basic cognitive processes were present in both archaic and
modern Homo sapiens, we must ask the question of whether
these temporarily separated peoples had the same structures
of mind, or "deep structures" in Wilber's sense. Do the obvious
differences involve transformations from one stage of cognitive
THE EVOLUTION OP CONSCIOUSNESS 27
development to a qualitatively different one, or are the
differences merely translations—cognitively equivalent
structures at the same level of development? Issac's (1976:283)
conclusions drawn from the Upper Paleolithic archaeological
evidence (40,000 years ago) suggests that the differences be
seen as translations, not transformations:'Most archaeologists
familiar with the field seem to be convinced that they are
dealing with the products of human societies in possession of
the full biological capabilities of our species as it exists today."
Wilberinsists that these earlier humans have different mental
structures from those of modern humans, but we see that his
characterizations are unfounded. We are forced to recognize
the existence of human societies some 40,000-100,000 years
ago which were cogni ti vely equivalent to contemporary society
in terms of cognitive capabilities, although not content or
translations.
MYTHIC MEMBERSHIP STAGE
Wilber suggests that about 12,000 B.P. there was the
development offarming consciousness" which was associated
with the development of a new stage of consciousness, the
mythic membership stage. Wilber asserts that at this time
some humans developed an extended sense of time and that
full-fledged language appeared. However, these people are
still characterized by part/whole and subject/predicate
confusions and lacking true ego development. Verbal membership,
or language based conception of self is seen as crucial:
Hanguage becomes the predominate vehicle of the separate
self... with language, the verbal mind could differentiate itself
out of the previous body-self (p. 92-3, emphasis in original).
Wilber follows Jaynes (1976) in this discussion, but Jaynes'
ideas have been rejected on several points by evidence provided
by extant languages, archaeology, and the reconstruction of
ancient languages (see Steklis 1976). There is indication of
considerable social and economic change around 12,000 B.P.
which may have involved an intensification of the use of
language, but the other personal changes which Wilber
suggests as indicative of this stage clearly occurred before the
agriculture revolution.
However, Wilber suggests that the majority of non-Western
peoples have remained at the verbal-membership stages, and
have not acquired fully developed egos or the development of
logical-rational thought. If the majority of the people of the
world lack fully developed egos, one wonders why the psychological
anthropologists (e.g., see Spindler 1978) have failed to
make this discovery. Using the conventional psychoanalytical
definition of the ego as a reality principle responsible for
keeping the id in check and aligning the individual's behavior
with physical and social reality, it should be apparent without
argument that all normal contemporary peoples have egos.
The archaeological evidence reviewed by R. White (1982; see
above) suggests that egoic structures as conventionally
conceived existed at least as long as 40,000 years ago, and the
comparative ethological evidence suggests that some form of
ego structures have probably existed in hominids for millions
of years. Wilber's insistence that the majority of non-Western
peoples are dominated by instinctual responses to external
stimuli and have not reached the solar-ego stage in his
schema is untenable. Human societies, especially
contemporary ones, are not dependent upon instinctual
behavior for their maintenance. As Tobias (1971a, 1971b)
pointsout, evenAustralopithecus depended more upon cultural
adaptation than instinct for survival.
SOLAR EGO
Wilber suggests that a new stage of "Solar Ego" consciousness
emerged in 2500 B.C., occurring during the era which
Childe (1951) refers to as the Urban Revolution. Wilber
suggests that during the solar ego stage we see the beginning
of truly rational and logical thought, formal operational
thinking, and the emergence of an exclusively egoic structure
of consciousness (p. 180-2). Wilber (1980:31-2) suggests that
the core of the mental-egoic stage, which provides the
ontogenetic model for the solar-ego stage, involves: the
development of a self concept; the emergence of an ego which
is characterized by the final emergence of the super-ego
proper; and the ability to take on abstract roles. Wilber states
that the solar ego emerged in the "West (Europe and Near
East)", and that the majority of non-Western peoples have
remained at the verbal-membership stages instead of reaching
the ego levels (footnote p. 187). The above discussions have
provided evidence that these abilities were both acquired long
ago, and are present cross-culturally.
Wilber's discussion of the solar ego stage depends primarily
upon Whyte (1951), who discusses what he calls the "European
dissociation...the distinguishing mark of European and
Western man" (p. 192). This mentality attained its most marked
form in European and Western peoples from 6th century B.C.
Greece to the present. This distinguishing mark is the result
of the Western ego not merely differentiating from the Great
Mother, or from nature, but of severing and dissociating from
her. Wilber emphasizes that this is "not merely a
differentiation, but a dissociation" (p. 192). "[TJhe emergence
of the ego level... in the West... was not just a differentiation
of the mind and body- which was a necessary and positive step
in evolution- but a dissociation of the mind from the body"
(p.191). In the development of the mental-ego, "the ego did not
just transform up and out of the typhonic and membership
stages, it violently repressed them" (p.181-182, emphasis in
original).
However, Wilber informs us in The Atman Project that
"repression is not transformation. We might say that repression
is one type of failure to clearly transform" (p.42-3). This
indicates that the solar ego or mental ego stage as conceived
by Wilber is not a transformation, but a degenerative
translation which is characteristic of particular social and
cultural traditions.
The widespread transcendence to level five among
shamans of typhonic cultures and transcendence to the highest
levels by sages of cultures at the mythic membership level
also suggests that the solar ego stage is a translation, not a
transformation. Wilber gives no indication that the shaman
must operate at the solar ego level (or even the membership
level) in developing from the archaic levels (2) to the lower
levels of superconsciousnes8 (level 5). Similarly, the shift from
Earth Mother (stage 2) to the Great Goddess (stage 6) which
occurred in eastern religions such as Buddhism apparently
occurred without a transformation to the mental or solar ego
level. If we do not allow for transformations which bypass the
solar ego level, then shamanic and yogic sages needed to
dissociate mind and body pathologically in the course of their
development, since Wilber argues that this is characteristic of
the solar ego stage.
28 ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS [1(3-4)1
CROSS CULTURAL EQUALITY OP COGNITIVE CAPACITIES
Wilber's relegation of non-Westerners to lower stages of
cognitive evolution is exemplified in his use of material from
extant or recently extant cultures (19th and early 20th century)
as examples or reflections of lower stages of development. The
belief that contemporary cultures with simple or technologically
primitive social structures can be used as
exemplifications of lower stages of human evolution is a
widespread cultural ethnocentrism and a problem which
vitiates Wilber's model and presentations. Several lines of
research establish that people from all cultures have and
utilize the same range of cognitive abilities.
Wilber suggests that the bulk of contemporary peoples
haven'tacquired formal operational thought. The 20thcentury
anthropological tradition has generally agreed with Boas
(1911), who argued that people in all cultures exhibit the same
range of thought processes attributed to the more "civilized"
peoples. Boas (1911) argued that valid inferences about thought
processes cannot be based upon the content of traditional
beliefs and customs. Thatis, mythic beliefs cannot be taken as
evidence about or exemplification of normal thought processes
any more than the false beliefs of scientists can be taken as
evidence that they lack the cognitive processes to think
scientifically.
Cross-cultural psychological researchers on cognitive
development (Piagetian) have frequently stated that people
in other cultures fail to develop to the same levels as
Westerners, but such research is vitiated by biases in method
and interpretation (See Cole and Scribner 1974). Culturally
relevantcross-cultural research has demonstrated that people
in all cultures go through all of Piaget's stages of mental
development and reach formal operations stage, although
people in some cultures show a lag in acquisition which is
directly related to differences in school experiences and other
learning experiences associated with urban environments
(See Berry and Dasen 1974; Dasen 1977; Cole and Scribner
1974).
Linguistic evidence establishes that all cognitive systems
are equally complex. Linguists emphasize the complexity of
all language systems and deny thatlanguages can be arranged
on a scale from simple to complex. Cole and Scribner (1974:27)
argue that Chomsky's theory of grammar establishes that
"...thinking processes of an individual cannot be less complex
or constructive than the rules required for speech production."
Since language acquisition and use is the most complex
human cognitive activity, and since there are no qualitative
differences in the complexity oflanguage rules, it is impossible
to conceive of "simple" or more "advanced" cognitive levels
among different cultures with equally complex languages
(Cole and Scribner 1974). Although it is possible that such
admonitions may not apply to the development of cognitive
skills at the higher levels of the evolution of consciousness,
they certainly apply to all reasoning abilities as conventionally
understood. If different groups of people possess equally
complex languages, some can hardly be considered preverbal
in their development, although the contexts in which they use
language and the extent to which they use it may differ.
The assertion of cognitive equality is based in the
recognition that the same range of conventionally recognized
cognitive abilities are used by people in all cultural groups,
although perhaps manifested only with respect to culturally
relevant materials. Thus, while abstract abilities among
people in Western industrial societies may be fairly assessed
with verbal syllogisms or other formal operations tests, such
materials are not culturally free; people from other cultures
may not be able to successfully demonstrate their capabilities
with such test materials. However, the same abstract
capabilities may be demonstrated with other materials, such
as in the classification of culturally relevant materials, in
making culturally relevant inferences, or in the diagnosis of
culturally dependent illness syndromes (See Levi-Strauss
1966, or Cole and Scribner 1974 for review of experimental
literature.) The failure of people in any group to solve complex
calculus or to order collections of electronic parts on the basis
of functional or class principles does not demonstrate the lack
of abstract thought abilities; the problems or materials may
not be those to which relevant existing capabilities can be
immediately generalized.
The main problem with Wilber's scheme is the inappropriateness
of an ontogenetic model for phylogenetic data. The
recapitulationist position (ontogeny recapitulates phytogeny)
was abandoned within biology during the last century under
the overwhelming weight of contrary evidence (Gould 1977).
Furthermore, Gould (1977) points out the mainstream
recapitulationists at most argued that the stages of ontogeny
repeat the adult forms of animals lower down on the scale of
organization. Such a model is clearly not appropriate for
humans. Although there apparently are stages in human
evolution, they are not the ones outlined by Wilber.
Pre-sapien hominids and perhaps Homo sapiens have
functioned at levels of cognitive developmentbelow the average
contemporary human. However, human societies cannot and
have not functioned at the uroboric levels or the lower levels
of the typhonic stage as outlined ontogenetically and phylogenetically
by Wilber. Chimpanzee development and the
presence oflanguage, social organization and self perception
among Australopithecines indicate that even pre-sapien
hominids have always functioned atalevel somewhere between
Wilber's typhonic and membership levels.
The increase in brain size from Australopithecus to Homo
Neanderthalis is accompanied by an increase in cultural
complexity. Given the direct relationship between relative
brain size and intelligence in lower animals, and recognizing
that selective pressures would have favored those hominids
whose mental capacities were more adapted to acquiring
culture, language and tool use, the increase in brain size must
be a central factor in the evolution in human consciousness.
The role of physical factors in the evolution of human
consciousness from Australopithecus to Homo Neanderthalis
makes Wilber's recourse to teleological explanation in terms
of return to Spirit unnecessary.
Although physical evolution can provide a basis for
explaining the gradual evolution of consciousness and cultural
tradition up until about 200,000-300,000 years ago, it seems
unlikely that such a mechanism can explain subsequent
evolution. During the past 100,000 years brain size has
actually slightly decreased; the factors guiding evolution of
human behavior and transcendence have been cultural
adaptations. The biological potential has been constant during
this time; social and cultural factors have been responsible for
the different forms and tendencies to seek transcendence.
The accumulated cultural evolution led to the development
of peoples at least 40-100,000 years ago which had
clearly developed egos, functionally comparable to that of the
THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 29
average Western person today, but without the extreme
dissociation which Wilber attributes to moderns. At this point
we must recognize the presence of the deep structures (Wilber's
sense) or biological and socially learned capacities necessary
for seeking transcendence. From this ego level we find many
translations, some favoring the achievement of transcendence
and transformation, such as the shamanic, yogic, and other
mystical schools. Other translations fostered the dissociation
between mind and body which blocked the path to
transformation, as Wilber suggests in his discussion of the
development of the solar ego.
I suggest that throughout the evolution of Homo sapiens,
particularly in the past 12,000 years, we find an increasing
individual repression of oneself. As Wilber points out "the
capacity for repression (defense mechanisms in general) exists
to one degree or another at almost every level of the spectrum
but it doesn't become really extensive until the verbal membership
level, and doesn't become truly 'powerful' until the egoic
level" (p. 262). The dates which Wilber assigns to the emergence
of the mythic membership and solar ego levels correspond
quite closely to the agriculture and urban revolutions,
respectively. In these sedentary societies we would expect the
need for greater individual self repression because of the
greater intensity of interpersonal contact and the inability to
escape conflict through fragmentation of the group, which
occurs more regularly in hunting and gathering bands. As
social interaction becomes more complex, we would also
expect the development of additional aspects of the social self,
required by diversification of the social world. This repression
and the diversification of the self clearly has implications for
understanding the development of the solar ego and its
inhibition of transformation to the higher state of
consciousness.
My point here is not to deny that there are important
differences in the cognitive styles of people in different cultures,
or to suggest that there are no systematic differences between
Western and non-Western cultures. There certainly are
considerable cross-cultural differences in personal awareness
and typical modes of cognition. Levi-Strauss (1966) suggests
differences in cultures which he characterizes as "hot" and
"cold," and explores differences in approaches to problem
solving which he labels bricoleur (jack-of-all-trades) and
engineer. These roughly correspond to some differences
between people in non-Western or traditional cultures versus
modern cultures, and bear some resemblance to the distinctions
which Wilber apparently wants to capture in distinguishing
mythic-membership societies from solar ego societies. People
in Western societies also tend to show greater field
independence, which is defined as the habitual tendency to
differentiate self from the environment; however, such
tendencies are influenced not only by social and psychological
factors, but environmental ones as well (e.g., see Witkin 1974;
Berry 1974). People in non-Western cultures have a tendency
to use proprioceptive modalities as opposed to verbal modalities
in learning (see Parades and Hepburn 1976, and subsequent
discussion). Scribner and Cole (1974) have pointed out that
learning in Westernized school systems primarily involves
learning in the verbal mode, in a system of abstract relations
isolated from personal experience. Cohen (1969)has discussed
the conflict of cognitive styles, contrasting traditional
modalities with those fostered in schooling. Goody (1977) has
argued that the development of literacy has profound effects
upon the organization of experience (c.f. Alford 1979). However,
the qualitative differences in capacities which Wilber suggests
do not in fact exist. The suggestion of such differences is the
result of the inability of investigators to overcome blocks to
communication, understanding, and assessment created by
the differencesbetween themselves and people of other cultures
they have studied.
Wilber's work is based upon the comparison of material
from many cultures, but his data is not taken from a representative
sample of human cultures. Arepresentative sample and
clear criterion for evaluation of the material are necessary for
assessing mythological materials, for establishing crosscultural
generalities, and for assessing cross-cultural
differences and similarities in stages of evolution of consciousness
or perception or perennial truths. Without criteria which
ensure that the materials used are representative of all
human cultures, we have no basis for asserting that the
conclusions we draw are generally valid for human societies.
The lack of criteria to ensure a representative sample leads to
a selective presentation of data; cases which confirm the
theoretical perspective are presented, while the cases which
contradict it are left out of the discussion. For instance,
Wilber's assessment of creation myths islimited to the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, without consideration of other traditions.
If a representative sample of creation myths were considered,
the similarities between them would provide a more reliable
basis for interpreting conditions of early humans, while
idiosyncrasies which might fortuitously support a particular
theoretical perspective could be eliminated.
Problems which result from the lack of clear criteria for
evaluating cross-cultural materials is illustrated in the
discussion of beliefs in primitive societies about the interconnectedness
of nature. Wilber suggests that magical beliefs
about this interconnectedness of nature is a result of the lack
of full differentiation of the psyche and the world, and does not
reflect the same interconnectedness as perceived by the
Eastern consciousness disciplines. Although the basic
conclusions are comparable if not essentially identical, Wilber
wants to attribute veridical perceptions to those consciousness
traditions which form the basis of his theoretical perspective
and background, but disallow the apparent occurrence of
comparable perceptions among those who are living in more
primitive economies and under simpler social conditions and
are therefore relegated to the lower levels of his evolutionary
scheme.
In spanning the many fields of inquiry necessary for a
vast project such as Up From Eden, one expects unavoidable
shortcomings, such as the reliance on selected authorities
who may not be representative of fields or disciplines, brief
presentations of complex positions, as well as omissions and
ideological differences with predominate theoretical
perspectives. However, Wilber's theory of evolution of human
consciousness is found to be lacking not only for these reasons,
but also because of the structure of his arguments, the
accuracy or competency of his selected authorities, and the
relevant evidence he fails to consider. If Wilber had proceeded
with the intent of inferring the states and evolution of
consciousness of early humans from the somewhat ambiguous
and incomplete data, the conclusions drawn would likely have
been different. However, the effort to force the phylogenetic
facts to fit an ontogenetic model has biased the selection,
assessment and interpretation of data. Furthermore, reliance
30 ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS [1(3-4)3
upon 19th century anthropological perspectives (e.g., Tylor
and Frazer) rather than contemporary anthropology further
undermines the accuracy and relevance of the work.
A highly critical review of anyone's work is scarcely a
rewarding task for the criquer or the critiqued. However,this
review is necessary given Wilber's status in the field and the
fact that his work is so highly esteemed among
transpersonalists. This review has dealt largely with the
physical evidence, and has avoided consideration of the
mythological information which provide the data Wilber uses
in his discussion of the forms of and substitutes for
transcendence. Wilber lacks a cross-culturally representative
sample of mythological materials and clear criteria for
assessing such materials. Furthermore, his errors in
consideration of the physical record require that his assessments
of the mood and mode of consciousness be critically
assessed and revised.
Acknowledgements. I thank David Jacobs, Roger Walsh and
Craig MacAndrew for their encouragement, and Duane
Metzger, Stanley Krippner, Bill Andrews and Chris Tbresdahl
for helpful suggestions. This review was originally written in
1982. It was rejected for publication for Re Vision andJournal
of TVanspersonal Psychology, journals where Ken Wilber
served in an editorial capacity. The paper was scheduled for
publication in Phoenix, but the journal was discontinued
before publication. The review here is not updated to include
relevant literature in the intervening years. Yet it addresses
fundamental issues in the interface of anthropology and
psychology which remain unaltered by the passage of time.
REFERENCES
Alford, Daniel
1979 The Effects of Literacy and Cognition on Being in the
World. Phoenix 3(l):31-42.
Arieti, Silvano
1967 The Intrapsychic Self. New York: Basic Books.
Becker, Ernest
1973 The Denial of Death. New York: Free Press.
Berdyaev, N.
1960 The Destiny of Man. New York: Harper.
Boas, Franz
1965 The Mind of Primitive Man. New York: Free Press.
Originally published in 1911.
Berry, John W.
1974 Ecological and Cultural Factors in Spatial Perceptual
Development. In J. Berry and P. R. Dasen, eds. Culture and
Cognition. London: Methuen.
Berry, John W., and P. R. Dasen, eds.
1974 Culture and Cognition. London: Methuen and Co.
Campbell, Joseph
1959 The Masks of God. 4 vols. New York: Viking.
C&ssier, Ernst
1944 An Essay on Man. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1953 The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. 3 vols. New Haven :Yale
University Press.
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, Suzanne
1976 The Ontogeny of Primate Intelligence and its Implication
for Communicative Potential: a Preliminary Report. In Origins
and Evolution of Language and Speech. S. Hamad, H. Steklis
and J. Lancaster, eds. Pp. 173-211. New York: New York
Academy of Sciences.
Child*, Gordon
1951 Man Makes Himself. New York: Men ton.
Cohen, Rosalie A.
1969 Conceptual Styles, Cultural Conflict and Non-Verbal Tests
of Intelligence. American Anthropologist. 71:828-856.
Cole, Michael, and Sylvia Scribner
1974 Culture and Thought. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Conkey, M.
1978 Style and Information in Cultural Evolution: Towards a
Predictive Model for the Paleolithic. In Social Archeology:
Beyond Subsistence and Dating. C. Redman, et aL, eda. New
York: Academic Press.
Dasen, P. R., ed.
1977 Piagetian Psychology: Cross-Cultural Contributions. New
York: Gardener Press.
Desmond, A.
1979 The Ape's Reflection. London: Blond and Briggs.
Fox, Hugh
1976 Gods of the Cataclysm. New York: Dorset Press.
Frazer, James G.
1929 The Golden Bough., 3rd ed., Vol 1. New York: Book League
of America.
Gebser, J.
1966 Ursprung und Gegenwart. Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlags-
Anhalt.
Goody, Jack
1977 The Domestication of the Savage Mind. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Gould, Stephen J.
1977 Ontogeny and Phylogeny. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Grof, Stanislav
1981 Review of Up from Eden. Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology 13(2).
Halifax, Joan
1979 Shamanic Voices. New York: Dutton.
Hamad Stevan R., Horst D. Steklis and Jane Lancaster, eds.
1976 Origins and Evolution of Langu age. New York: New York
Academy of Sciences.
Holloway, Ralph L.
1976 Paleoneurological Evidence for Language Origins. In
Origins and Evolution of Language. S. Hamad, H. Steklis and
J. Lancaster, eds. Pp. 330-348. New York: New York Academy
of Sciences.
Isaac, Glynn L.
1976 Stages of Cultural Elaboration in the Pleistocene: Possible
Archeological Indicators of the Development of Language
Capabilities. In Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech.
S. Hamad, H. Steklis and J. Lancaster, eds. Pp. 275-288. New
York: New York Academy of Sciences.
Jaynes, Julian
1976 The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton Mifllin.
Jolly, Clifford J., and Fred Plog.
1979 Physical Anthropology and Archaeology. New York: Alfred
Knopf.
Levi-Strauss. Claude
1962 Totemism. Boston: Beacon Press.
1966 The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Linden, E.
1974 Apes, Men and Language. New York: Dutton.
Marshack, Alexander
1972 The Roots of Civilization. New York: McGraw Hill.
Montagu, Ashley
1976 Toolmaking, Hunting, and the Origin of Language. In
Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech. S. Hamad, H.
Steklis, and J. Lancaster, eds. Pp. 226-274. New York: New
York Academy of Sciences.
Neumann, Erich
1973 The Origins and History of Consciousness. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Parades, A., and M. Hepburn
1976 The Split Brain and the Culture-and-Cognition Paradox.
Current Anthropology 17:121-127.
Premack, David
1976 Intelligence in Ape and Man. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
THE EVOLUTION OP CONSCIOUSNESS 31
Rumbaugh, Duane M.
1977 Langu age Learning by a Chimpanzee. New York: Academic
Press.
Scribner, Sylvia, and Michelle Cole.
1973 Cognitive Consequences ofFormal and Informal Education.
Science 182: 553-559 .
Sebeok, Thomas Albert, and Umiker-Sebeok,Donna Jean, eds.
1980 Speaking of Apes. New York: Plenum Press.
Spindler, G.
1978 The Making of Psychological Anthropology. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Staniford, P.
1982 Ken Wilber's Transpersonal View of Evolution. Phoenix
6:163-166.
Steliks, Horst D.
1976 Discussion: Paleobiological Approaches. In Origins and
Evolution of Language and Speech. S. Harnad, H. Steklis and
J. Lancaster, eds. Pp. 326-329. New York: New York Academy
of Sciences.
Tanner, Nancy, and Adrienne Zihlman.
1976 The Evolution of Human Communication: What Can
Primates Tell Us? In Origins and Evolution of Language and
Speech. S. Harnad, H. Steklis and J. Lancaster, eds. Pp. 467-
480. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
Tobias, Philip V.
1971a Man's Past and Future. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand
Press.
1971b The Brain in Hominid Evolution. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Tylor, Edward Burnett
1924 Primitive Culture. 7th ed. New York: Brentano.
White, J.
1982 Ken Wilber's Transpersonal View of Human Evolution.
Phoenix 6:155-163.
White, Randall
1982 Rethinking the Middle/Upper Paleolithic Transition.
Current Anthropology 23:169-192.
Whyte. L.
1950 The Next Development in Man. New York: Mentor Books.
Wilber, Kenneth
1977 The Spectrum of Consciousness. Wheaton, IL: Quest.
1980 The Atman Project. Wheaton, IL: Quest.
1981 Up from Eden. New York: Anchor Books.
Wilber, Kenneth, J. Engler, and Daniel Brown
1986 Transformations of Consciousness: Conventional and
Contemplative Perspectives on Development. Boston:
Shambhala.
Winkelman, M.
1987 Transformations of Consciousness: Conventional and
Contemplative Perspectives on Development by K. Wilber, J.
Engler, and D. Brown. AASC Newsletter 3(2):5-6.
Witkin, H.
1974 CognitiveStylesAcrossCultures./n Culture and Cognition.
J. Berry and P. Da sen, eds. London: Methuen.
Wobst, H. Martin
1974 Boundary Conditions for Paleolithic Social Systems: A
Simulation Approach. American Antiquity 39:147-178.
"The extreme complexity of man's emotional reactions to life finds necessarily its counterpart in his attitude to death." -Malinowski